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Emotional and Embodied Knowledge:
Implications for Critical Practice
COLIN PEILE
The University of Queensland
Department of Social Work and Social Policy
Within the practice orientation of the Critical Social Work tradition there
has been a dominance of conceptual and rational processes. This has lead to
afailure to acknowledge the importance of bodily and emotive knowledge for
practice theory. This paper offers a rudimentary and tentative epistemology
which recognizes the importance of the body, emotions, ideas and their
context. These ideas invite a reconsideration of critical theories of change.
This paper explores the problems that emerge for social work
practice because of the neglect of bodily and emotional knowl-
edge (with a particular focus on critical theory) and provides a
tentative theory of how bodily and emotional knowledge can
be understood in relation to conceptual knowledge. This will
provide a possible direction for reformulating critical theory and
critical approaches to social work practice. To begin it is necessary
to first explore the place of rational knowledge.
It is a common view that to achieve enlightenment requires
rationality and as a consequence the subjugation of our bodies
and emotions which are associated with irrationality and desire.
Turner (1984) suggests this is in part a reflection of the western
Christian tradition which sees the body as the location of cor-
rupting appetite, of sinful desire and of private irrationality. The
body needs to be controlled to maintain the social order. This is
also consistent with the influence of Cartesian thought where it is
the mind which defines humans as social beings (Shilling, 1993).
In this context, knowledge is associated with ideas and thinking.
We develop knowledge about bodies and emotions, they have no
knowledge of their own. This paper will seek to demonstrate that
the body and emotions are a way of knowing which need to be
valued equally along side conceptual knowing.
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Interestingly, the neglect of the body and emotions is not only
epistemological. Turner (1984) and Shilling (1993) have both high-
lighted the neglect of the body in sociological theory. This is also
the case in psychology (Golman, 1996) and so not surprisingly, the
dominance of rationality is assumed in the social work literature
with few exceptions (Kondrat, 1992). Critical social work practice
is no exception (Healy,1996).
Critical Theory and Rationality
Critical theory grew up within the enlightenment tradition
which claimed a rational process of developing knowledge could
enable us to gain control over our social and physical environ-
ment. This tradition grew in tandem with the rapid development
of technology and capitalist societies and it gave rise to a class of
experts that could guide industry and governments to further the
goals of capitalism. In this context deterministic, biological views
of the body and emotions dominated, encouraging an under-
standing that the body and emotions needed to be controlled to
enable a civil society and efficient production. This control became
the goal of the social sciences with positivist embracement of a
detached objectivity the main epistemology (Fay, 1975; Ife, 1997).
The critical tradition positioned itself in opposition to the
private ownership of capital and the domination of the wealthy.
This domination was seen to lead the powerless to a false un-
derstanding of their own situation in which they conformed to
the ideas of the ruling class. Enlightenment thinking however
generated the notion that the oppressed by becoming rationally
aware of their circumstances could break this false consciousness
and then act to achieve the development of a non-oppressive
society and process of government (Fay, 1987).
The critical tradition also challenged positivist epistemology.
Marx and other critical theorists drew on Hegel's concept of the
dialectic. Hegel used this notion to understand the process of de-
veloping knowledge, describing a dialectical progression through
four stages. He begins firstly with sense certainty which is a belief
that we can know the world directly through our sense experience
and that such experience offers an objective truth. This however, is
challenged by the second stage of perception which highlights that
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observation is actually language dependent and so perceptions
do not arise from the object specifically but are universals which
we bring to the experience. Perception however is also limited
as all perceptions require a perception not only of the object but
also of the opposite of the object, (that is, all the things it is not).
This requires understanding the relationship between perceptions.
The stage of understanding however also fails and leads to his
final stage of self-consciousness. In self consciousness we realize
we are not separate from the object of our observation but are
actively involved in manipulating and changing that object. That
is, reality is a product of our actions and so can only be properly
understood by recognizing, in a self-conscious way, our own part
in this process of transformation (Hegel, 1910; Marcova, 1982).
For Hegel the truth could only be uncovered through an active
involvement in reality not from a detached objective position.
Marx adopted a similar position (Bologh, 1979) but in con-
trast to Hegel's conservatism he saw the need for a revolutionary
consciousness. This involved a recognition by the oppressed of the
ways in which this oppression has occurred along with an under-
standing of how such oppression could be resisted. Knowledge
only has validity by attempting to transform reality (Fay, 1975;
Mao-tse-tung, 1967). This Hegelian/Marxist epistemology is in
stark contrast to the positivist underpinnings of capitalism but
the dominance of rationality is still not challenged as the rational
conceptual process of consciousness raising is a precondition for
radical action to change society. Implied in this position is that
bodies and emotions are socially constructed rather than biolog-
ically fixed, but nevertheless, rationality is still dominant and is
still the vehicle for achieving change to our bodies and emotions.
The notion of dialectics allowed a social theory which made
conflict, contradiction and transformation unavoidable aspects
of social life. This gave impetus and legitimacy to the devel-
opment of social movements and processes of social change.
Broadly within the enactment of the critical tradition, two styles
of practice can be identified and perhaps seen on a continuum.
On one end we have a dogmatic approach which legitimated a
vanguard acting on behalf of the oppressed group and which
tried to educate or raise the consciousness of the oppressed in a
didactic way. At the other end activists engaged in a process of
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asking strategic or critical questions (Fook, 1993; Mullaly, 1993)
to help an oppressed group recognize for themselves their own
false consciousness and to formulate their own revolutionary
consciousness. Armed with an analysis that their problems are
not their fault it is assumed that this oppressed group will then be
in a position to challenge their oppressors and to transform their
reality (Fay, 1975, 1987; Fook, 1993; Mullaly, 1993). Freire calls this
the process of conscientization (Freire, 1972). Critical social work
in the main has been attracted to this second Freireian tradition
(Leonard, 1984; Ife, 1997).
The critical objective of consciousness raising and conscious
action assumes that knowledge resides in peoples' minds: an
'idealistic theory of behaviour which assumes that people's be-
havioural, perceptual, and emotive dispositions are solely the re-
sult of mental, essentially discursive processes' (Fay, 1987, p. 149).
The extent of the domination of the rational is given a clear
illustration in Ife's (1997) embracement of the image of critical
social workers as 'street level intellectuals'. This rationality is not
only a character of radical or critical practice however, it is in
accord with most styles of social work practice (see Howe, 1987;
Payne, 1991) which seek via a process of 'talk' to enable clients to
gain new insights and understandings.
This intellectual elitism assumes there is a vacant territory
that is waiting to be colonialised by rationality, but it will be
argued here that the territory is full, and ready to sometimes
resist and challenge rational forms of knowing. Fay (1987) points
out that while the exploited may adopt a radical consciousness,
their bodies may continue to behave in ways that reinforce their
oppression. Our bodies have learnt to survive and move in the
world in particular ways. A rational decision to behave differently
does not mean our bodies will follow or that anyone else's body
will follow.
Limits of Rationality
Critical theory over the last hundred years has waxed and
waned in popularity principally in relation to the strength of
conservative positions. Recently however challenges to critical
theory have emerged from the non-conservative postmodern and
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feminist postmodern directions. Postmodernism has challenged
the very idea of rationality, the possibility of self conscious actors
and the desirability of any positions claiming truth or universal
applicability (Leonard, 1997; Peile, 1997). This has lead to what
Grosz (1993) calls a 'crisis of reason' and to the disappearance of
the epistemological certainty on which critical praxis has relied
(Leonard, 1997). A consequence of this has been for the movement
of many critical theorists to a more postmodern framework or for
attempts to redevelop critical theory in relation to postmodern
insights (Healy, 1996; Leonard, 1997). This epistemological un-
certainty has opened up an interest in more marginal ways of
knowing such as to do with feelings and intuition (Ife, 1997).
In addition feminists have long challenged the dominance of
positivist epistemologies, advocating a more open epistemol-
ogy (Harding, 1986) and the relevance of bodily and emotional
knowing (Jagger & Bordo, 1989; Grosz, 1993, 1995). Thus, both
Postmodernism and Feminism have lifted up the importance of
the body (and emotions) for social theory (Healy, 1996; Tayson,
1998; Tennant, 1998). While drawing inspiration from both tra-
ditions, my own theorizing does not neatly fit with either, as
I have reservations about the way the body is treated in both.
It needs to be acknowledged that both areas are experiencing
rapid theoretical development with a huge variety of different
positions within each, so I do not want to close off the potential
for engagement with either in the future. However, in the context
of this paper I think it will be useful to situate myself in relation
to these traditions at least in a very general and crude way.
The postmodernists talk about the body as a site or text upon
which various discourses are inscribed (Leonard, 1997). For some
the body is pictured as 'docile', while for others as a potential site
for resistance (Tayson, 1998), but in both cases the materiality
of the body is neglected (Shilling, 1993). At best its fleshy real-
ity is relativised as just one possible discourse about the body.
Radical poststructural feminists recognize the body as a site for
alternative knowledge building and action (Healy, 1996). They
suggest male and female bodies have different capacities which
arise from different lived experience but that these capacities are
not just inscribed in our consciousness they are inscribed on the
body (Healy, 1996). For postmodern feminists, knowledge can
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not be disembodied but rather, 'the inclusion of embodied expe-
rience is argued to be central to, and indistinguishable from, the
knowledge making process' (Tayson, 1998). Knowledge is thus
relativised as a consequence of the different embodied experience
of different people.
While the relativism of postmodernism and postmodern fem-
inism provides a useful orientation from which to develop a
critique, it is not very useful to the development of constructive
actions (Peile, 1997) something that is essential to a constructive
critical tradition. My own orientation has arisen more from the
work of Fay (1987), Polanyi (1958,1966) and Schon (1983) and has
a more grand theorizing quality. I take seriously the criticisms of
feminists and postmodernists about the totalitarian qualities of
modernist grand narratives but suggest that the problem is not
with their grand character but rather arises because of their deter-
minist cosmology (Peile, 1994; Zimmerman 1989). The totalitarian
quality comes from their belief in the very possibility of control
(Bateson, 1972) based on a deterministic world view, not from
their attempt to make sense of the whole. It is through attempting
to make sense of the whole that one can gain a respect for the
parts. The interdependence of things, which has similarities to
the critical concept of over-determination and totality (Bologh,
1979; Resnick and Wolff, 1987) encourages motivation for con-
structive action, as people recognize 'we are all in this together'.
The postmodern position however can tend to an ethical rela-
tivism which mitigates against action and in a sense adopts a new
form of determinism 'discourse determinism'. I see both 'reality
determinism' and 'discourse determinism' (Leonard, 1997, p. 11)
as problematic. Attempting to make sense of the whole, without
assuming certainty, I think is a better platform for social work
practice.
Having situated myself in relation to Feminism and Post-
modernism I want to now return to the neglect of the body and
emotions and to explain something of what I mean by bodily and
emotion knowledge before further theorising about them.
Body and Emotional Knowledge
Fay (1987) suggests there are real limits to the process of con-
sciousness raising because of the privilege it affords rationality.
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He points out that knowledge not only exists in our minds but is
also enfolded in peoples' muscles and skeletons and the existence
of this knowledge calls into question the privileged place given to
conceptual knowledge. Much of our everyday life is reliant on this
bodily knowledge. Some basic forms of knowledge are to do with
movement: walking, running, jumping, standing and so on. Our
knowledge of how to do these things is primarily unconscious
and involves no rational thought, the knowledge is contained
in our bodies. The body has its own form of knowing and can
learn directly through 'bodily discourse: through images which
tell us what clothes, body shape, facial expression, movements,
and behaviour is required' (Bordo, 1989, p. 17).
Further, it becomes apparent that rational knowledge in some
situations, is an inferior form of understanding. It has been esti-
mated that a written manual sufficient to accurately describe all
the muscular movements and choices necessary to ride a bicycle
would be over a hundred pages long. However if a rider tried to
consciously implement such rules the calculations would be too
difficult and slow to avoid falling. Rationally, it is a very com-
plex behaviour and yet our bodies can learn to ride without this
conscious understanding. This body memory is clearly evident
when contexts change and we continue to behave in the same
way even though such behaviour is now unproductive or even
dangerous such as when motoring in a country which drives
on the opposite side of the road. Phobias and eating disorders
provide other examples.
As Schon puts it 'it seems right to say that our knowing is
in our actions' (1983, p. 49). Kondrat (1992) suggests that knowl-
edge embodied in the act is the most readily useable practical
knowledge. This 'knowing-in-action' as Schon (1983) describes it,
refers to a skilful action which does not arise from an intellectual
operation and may have been learnt without a conscious rational
process. Polanyi (1966) adds to our appreciation of these issues
through his notion of tacit knowledge: the knowledge which
informs our actions and yet can not necessarily be consciously
recalled. He demonstrates how all observation and so all science
is dependent on this type of knowledge and so with it the personal
elements that are enfolded in this subsiderary or tacit awareness.
For Jaggar (1989) reason is seen in opposition to emotion. Rea-
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son has been over time associated with the male, while emotion is
devalued in its connection with the female and with irrationality.
Indeed, the enlightenment sought to replace emotion with reason.
Jaggar seeks to reverse such valuations by recognizing the impor-
tance of emotion in the process of inquiry. Our emotions represent
habituated responses to certain events that resonate with other
similar experiences. They represent our emotional evaluations
of different situations and so are essential to our processes of
observation and understanding. We feel sad for others when they
have suffered a loss; angry when we see others dominated or
exploited. Such feelings can provoke us to action, to support or
to challenge. This store of attitudes and evaluations forms our
actions and can be seen as a store of knowledge. 'Emotions prompt
us to act appropriately, to approach some people and situations
and to avoid others, to caress and cuddle, fight or flee' (Jaggar,
1989, p. 155).
Healy (1996) gives attention to the gendered body knowledge
in practice. She suggests that female workers tend to have a bodily
knowledge in the form of unconscious communication processes
which seek to minimise status differences and which emphasise
their connectedness to the other. This knowledge is consistent
with the egalitarian objectives of critical practice but at the same
time made women vulnerable to questioning of their competence.
She claims that activist literature has tended to assume the pow-
erfulness of the worker but missed this more contradictory and
complicated understanding of the power of female activists, an
analysis made possible by attention to the bodily knowledges
involved.
In social work, bodily and emotive knowing is sometimes
implied in discussions of the nature of practice wisdom, however
such wisdom is still generally spoken about in a conceptual way
where it refers to: the accumulation of various pieces of infor-
mation, assumptions and judgements (DeRoos, 1990); or implicit
cognitive schemata (Scott, 1990). The rational is still privileged.
The revalorizing of bodily and emotive knowledges will require a
different perspective and new understandings. To begin to move
in this direction we need to consider: the relationship of body
and emotional knowledge to conceptual knowledge; their rela-
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tionship to the context; and how both develop, that is the process
of bodily and emotive learning. Each area will be looked at in turn.
Mind, Body and Emotion
In the forms of bodily knowledge already discussed cognition
can have varying degrees of possible involvement. We can con-
sciously decide to alter our habitual movements, for example to
be patient with our children rather than to physically discipline
them. While this is initially difficult, our bodies can gradually
learn or accommodate this cognitive instruction. In this way the
body is formed by the mind. Alternately, our bodies appear to
learn directly without any conscious involvement. It is a debatable
issue as to how much our bodies are preprogramed from concep-
tion, but it would seem evident that how we breathe, our physical
characteristics, and our desires for food and physical comfort are
built in. Given that all these things impact and constrain what and
how we think, we can see that the body also forms the mind. It
often appears that our emotions are a direct follow on from certain
thoughts or actions. Yet at other points emotions seem to be the
initiator of thoughts and actions. Depression will lead to negative
thoughts and a passive slumped body. Anger and frustration can
lead to the physical abuse of those in dependent relationships.
This suggests that the mind, body and emotion all inform
each other in a mutual process. However, the relationship is more
complicated than this. At one level mind, body and emotion are
inseparably enfolded in each other, but at another level they can
appear as separate realms which resist the influence of each other
or alternately one can appear to dominate the others.
The inseparable connection--Cognitive knowledge is inescap-
ably 'reinforced by particular bodily and behavioural disposi-
tions' (Fay, 1987, p. 149) and emotional states. For example, while
language acquisition is a conceptual task, it is also a bodily one
which requires the correct movements of one's mouth and other
muscles. According to Polanyi all thought has bodily roots (1966,
p. 15). Similarly along side any thought or bodily movement
in a particular context there will be an associated emotional
state (Jagger, 1989). Simply, thought, emotion and behaviour
are inseparable, they occur simultaneously and are in constant
48 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
interaction. It is impossible not to think, feel and act. We may
focus on one but the other two are always implicitly or explicitly
present.
Inseparable but autonomous-Now this inseparability implies
that a change in the one area of thought, feeling or behaviour
will inevitably lead to changes in the other areas. However this is
clearly not always the case. For example, a person with a phobia
can come to have a conscious understanding of the irrationality
and dangers of their actions yet their emotions and bodies con-
tinue to respond in similar ways. An abusive father may have
told himself that hitting was not a good thing and yet in certain
situations he continues to act in these ways. A further example is
the great disparity that can exist between the espoused theories of
professionals (their ideas) and their 'theories in use' (behaviour)
and the absence of any awareness of this disparity (Argyris &
Schon, 1977).
So while inseparably enfolded or connected, it is clear that
the knowledges of the body, emotion and mind can be in con-
tradiction or resist each other. The knowledge contained in each
is of a very different order. In the mind, knowledge is stored as
concepts, ideas, words and images. Muscular knowledge is stored
in patterns of muscular co-ordination, and in the very structure
of our muscular development and as physical reflexes. Emotional
knowledge is stored as feelings which resonate or contrast with
other feeling states in us and in others. So while each one can't
exist without the other two, each realm has a certain autonomy.
To properly understand this we need to add another dimension
to our discussion, that of the context.
The Context
Bodies and the external environment-From a humanist and ide-
alist perspective we can see ourselves in a position of attempting
to master our physical and social environment, and new learning
occurs as we try to use our bodies to reshape our environment.
The opposite perspective (more common in poststructural and
critical thought) is that we are formed by those environments, that
'our bodies are trained, shaped, and impressed with the stamp of
prevailing historical forms of selfhood, desire, masculinity, femi-
ninity'(Bordo, 1989, p. 14). 'Civilization carves meanings onto and
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out of bodies' (Grosz, 1993, p. 197). The architecture of buildings
affects who we relate to. Manual labour in the service of employ-
ers leads to particular muscular and fine motor development. To
fit in with our society requires 'in part becoming a certain sort of
body' (Fay, 1987, p. 148) and adopting certain sorts of emotions.
Both perspectives are partial views which need to be consid-
ered together in an interactional way. Bodies and their material or
physical environment (including the bodies of others) are in a pro-
cess of continuous mutual formation. At various points we may
give emphasis to the way in which we form our environment and
at other times to how the environment is forming us but the reality
is both processes are continuous and inescapable. Nurturing a
child involves in some way shaping that child through the acts of
feeding, cuddling and play. The parent however is shaped by the
very same acts. However, as was suggested about the relationship
between mind, body and emotions, the relationship between the
body and its physical context is also a complex one in which each
realm, while inseparable may resist the other, so that changes in
one are not immediately or necessarily transmitted to the other.
We have then at the same time connected but autonomous and
potentially rebellious bodies or contexts.
Knowledge talked about in this way leads to an appreciation
of non-conceptual forms of knowledge held in feelings, actions
and behaviours rather than the mind. This recognition can be
extended to see the potential for knowledge to be contained not
just within people but within the social and material context as
well. Contexts can be seen to have a 'memory' of what has previ-
ously occurred which persists through time and can be recovered
in the sense that it will lead to the shaping of other bodies in
a similar way. Lecture theatres organise the bodies of teachers
and students into particular positions where all eye contact is be-
tween the teacher and the student with little eye contact possible
between students. This sort of architectural arrangement invokes
and reinforces certain relationships of power and other expecta-
tions which leads students and staff to behave in habitual and
historically structured ways. Any attempt to develop a different
set of relationships and expectations will actually be resisted by
the architecture. The lecture theatre contains a knowledge about
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these social arrangements that over the years it impresses on
successive groups of students and staff.
Similarly the standard detached three bedroom home in sub-
urbia carries a memory of the appropriateness of a nuclear family
structure acting to reinforce and affirm beliefs in this sort of family
structure. Thus both the body and the context are sites where
knowledge is stored. Bodily knowledge is stored externally in the
bricks, cement, and spatial shapes that surround us and internally
within our muscles, bones and patterns of movement: knowledge
that is transferred from one site to the other without any conscious
awareness being required.
Emotions and the context-A common sense conception of emo-
tions is that they are an internal, private, individual experience
that leads people to respond to their context in particular ways.
However, like the body, emotions only exist within a particular
social, discursive and material context and so are simultaneously
an individual and social experience. We are trained within our
families and by our broader culture to adopt and suppress dif-
ferent emotional responses in certain situations. Our emotional
knowledge is thus formed by the emotional context around us.
Further, our feelings resonate with the experience of others. When
some one is sad we can appreciate this indirectly through our
previous experience of sadness. This emotional resonance is not
just limited to the experiences of others; it can occur with pets and
even inanimate objects. For example emotions can be enfolded in
and can be unfolded from works of art, literature and music. Thus
emotional knowledge is stored internally as memories of feelings
and externally in the feeling states of others and in various forms
of material culture which can reinvoke these states.
Emotional knowledge reciprocally forms and is formed by
the social context. Again, however, resistance is possible. Children
may often feel they are to blame for how they are treated by adults,
feeling guilty for their own abuse. However, a child may also
get angry and challenge adult control. When resistant emotions
are shared with others in similar oppressive situations, people
gain greater confidence in their own emotional evaluations. The
sharing of similar emotional evaluations can be described as an
emotional paradigm in much the same way as we talk about
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intellectual paradigms. We could further consider the competition
between different emotional paradigms. Body knowledge could
also potentially be classified into different paradigms, reflecting
different competing bodily knowledges.
The epistemology of bodily and emotive knowing
Having established these distinctions and the relationships
between different areas, we are now in a position to consider
how learning takes place in each site. Learning takes place when
there is some difference generated in the interaction between the
knowledges of the body, mind or emotion and their context. The
difference leads to a transmission of the knowledge from one site
to the other.
One way of understanding this learning process is via the
concept of co-ordination. To catch a ball requires co-ordination
of ones body in relation to the movement of the ball through
a particular physical terrain. Errors in catching will lead to re-
finements and the development of bodily knowledge. Where co-
ordination is unsuccessful, frustration develops which may result
in a withdrawal from the activity or further learning attempts.
Once coordination is achieved, bodily learning ceases until the
task varies in some way. This discussion can be seen as a metaphor
for the basic principle of learning.
The existence of dis-coordinate knowledge between emo-
tions, bodies, minds and the context will encourage a knowledge
change in at least one realm. If an abusive father believes (concep-
tually) hitting is a bad thing but his body knowledge continues
to lash out, learning will lead to either the modification of his
ideas or his body. Learning involves the transfer of knowledge
from one site to another. The direction of this transfer does not
necessarily correspond to its truthfulness or benefit. So in valuing
body and emotive knowledge we need also to be aware of its po-
tential capacity to be exploitive in just the same way as conceptual
knowledge can be.
Further, both bodily and emotive knowledge are historical
and situational. Versions of each could be relevant to the current
context and time, while completely out of co-ordination at a dif-
ferent time and situation. Thus, body and emotional knowledge
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is not essentially correct or incorrect, rather it can be either co-
ordinated with the material, emotional and social context or can
be out of step. (By implication cognitive knowledge is in exactly
the same position). Use of the strap for discipline in our time
is seen as abuse but in earlier history was equated with good
parenting.
Being out of step creates the potential for learning (for a
new co-ordination), but it also creates the possibility of forced
learning (the attempted imposition of knowledge from one area
over another). Bodies which are out of step can create tensions,
leading to attempts to bring them back into line; to regulate bodies
(Grosz, 1995). Domination can occur in mental, physical and
emotional ways, while at the same time resistance is possible.
This domination can be explained in terms of a network of co-
ordinated knowledges which act to reinforce its own legitimacy
but then challenges, resists or rejects any marginal rebellious
knowledge. For example in the current climate where rationality
is valued, any promotion of emotive or bodily knowledge will
be resisted. This political process can also be applied within
an individual. A small, rogue, sad emotion will be unlikely to
have an impact on someone's general happy emotional state. The
persistence of dis-co-ordinate knowledge however highlights the
potential of the marginal to resist the dominance of this network
of co-ordinate knowledge, perhaps even shattering the network
(White, 1995).
So while the difference creates the potential for learning, learn-
ing is not essential. Huge disjunctures can exist between areas
without any learning being attempted. As mentioned, Argyris
and Schon (1977) have pointed out the very great differences
that can exist between professionals espoused theory and their
theory in use. While clearly a limit to our potential learning, it
is actually fortunate that we can cope with such disjunctures so
there is some limit to the demands upon us to continually learn
and change. Given the huge contradictions that exist between
our ideas, actions, feelings and those of others, if the differences
between them required an immediate direct effect we would have
no time to rest, being forced to continuously deal with all the
incongruities. We would be left in a constant chaotic state of
turmoil and change. A sense of identity relies on holding to some
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conceptual, bodily or emotional knowledge despite the discord
that exists. Thus the capacity to hold inconsistent knowledges in
different realms is essential. It then allows time for parts of the
discord to be worked on at a more acceptable pace.
Much work needs to be done to further explore the fuller
picture of the process of knowledge development and its impli-
cations for different disciplines. At this point it may be useful to
tentatively highlight some of the significant implications in the
area of critical social work practice so as to encourage further
exploration of bodily and emotive knowledge in this area.
Implications for Critical Social Work
Missing in critical theories of change, is the importance of
bodily and emotive knowledge in developing an understanding
the processes of domination and resistance. Believing change can
occur simply through a self conscious action is to miss a very.large
component of the problem being tackled. While the oppressed can
gain a new critical insight or consciousness (which is intended
to encourage new behaviour) this may actually have little be-
havioural impact if their old bodily and emotional knowledge
continues to implicitly govern their actions. A parent may have
decided conceptually to never hit their child again but his body
seems to continue to strike out in certain situations. Workers may
decide to challenge their employer's harassment, but emotionally
can not find the courage to initiate the action.
How then can we alter people's bodies and emotions to chal-
lenge the processes of domination? Initially three possible direc-
tions seem relevant but, as will be explained, are also limited.
Firstly, the limits of consciousness raising could be used to sup-
port a more dogmatic orientation which seeks to legitimate the
imposition of critical theory by force. This could involve mili-
tary or physical intimidation and control of educational content.
However, such an approach fails to take account of the bodily
and emotional knowledge that would be learnt by the population
through such processes. While people may be educated to believe
they have been liberated or empowered, their bodies would have
actually learnt greater subservience, an outcome which would be
opposite to that actually desired by critical theory.
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A second direction given some support by Fay (1987) has
a more individual focus and involves various body therapies
which use physical manipulation as a way of resolving various
problems (Bradford, 1996). The suggestion is that perhaps critical
practice may need to incorporate such approaches to assist people
in achieving the sort of bodies and emotions necessary for critical
practice. Caution is required however, because while many of
these approaches recognize bodily and emotive forms of know-
ing, they are often taken to be the 'truth', missing the contextual
and historical specificity of bodily and emotional knowledge em-
phasised in this paper. These approaches can valorize knowledge
of the body over that of the conceptual, a reversal of what is privi-
leged, which simply substitutes one form of dogma with an other.
Third, it could be argued that all that is required is a greater
conscious awareness of body and emotional processes. This, how-
ever, just reasserts the privileged position of the rational. It limits
our understanding of these processes to that which can be concep-
tually defined, and in so doing transform bodily and emotional
knowledge into a conceptual form.
What is required is a new way of extending our awareness,
not just conceptually but in an embodied and emotive form.
Along side a critical self consciousness, we need a critical bodily
awareness and a critical emotional awareness. Just as we seek
to develop a greater conceptual analysis of our society, we also
need to develop our emotional sensitivity to the emotional pro-
cesses of domination, and to the dominant and resistant forms
of emotional knowledge. We also need a bodily and physical
awareness of the material or bodily processes of domination and
the resistant and dominant bodily knowledge experienced. This
could all be termed as the development of a critical awareness and
will involve not only becoming more aware of the knowledge of
mind, body and emotion it will also involve an awareness of con-
tradictions between each realm, and the contradictions between
these realms and the knowledge of the conceptual, physical and
emotional context. This affirms a materialist orientation, but it
is a fleshy, emotional materialism rather than a cold, determin-
istic one.
A critical process of change will not just involve consciousness
raising but rather a more holistic process of conceptual, bodily and
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emotional development. Holistic in this sense means that each
should be seen together (with out valorizing one) so that each
realm of knowledge can learn from the other. Holistic also means
that body, emotional and conceptual knowledge is recognized
as enfolded in the various levels of ones self, the other, and the
broader conceptual, physical and emotional context. Constructive
change will require change at all levels. Such a view opens up the
potential for recognizing new opportunities for change as well
as perhaps unacknowledged processes of resistance and change
already occurring.
New possibilities may take the form of nondiscursive ac-
tion which challenge and change the bodily and emotive knowl-
edge of one's self, others and the societal context. This could
involve for example experiments with altering and developing a
non-oppressive architecture of homes, industry, schools, waiting
rooms and so on, or perhaps encouraging and using different
forms of art and music to build a less oppressive emotional
context. It may involve adaptations of body therapies to assist
people in embracing less subservient and conforming behaviours
and more confident, optimistic and courageous emotions. Such
action should always be done with an attempt to explain the
purpose and rationale of such actions, even though such expla-
nations will be limited and the understanding of such actions can
only properly be understood through direct emotional and bodily
experience.
Before experimenting with new forms of activist practice,
however, it would seem wise to explore the more everyday bodily
and emotive practices that are already a part of what we would
normally consider good practice, but which have been unac-
knowledged because of the dominance of rational conceptual
approaches. Some recent research by Tennant (1998) and Healy
(1996) point to the very important process and relationship activi-
ties of women in community work and activist practice which are
not recognized and even denigrated as they are based on bodily
and emotional knowledges. Further research on the bodily and
emotive knowledge of successful activists could reveal a wealth
of knowledge for strengthening activist practice.
In a similar way it will also be of enormous value to pay
attention to how people in situations of oppression successfully
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resist dominatory forces in bodily and emotive ways. Perhaps
many current behaviours which are seen as consequences of
our oppressive systems could actually be redefined as forms of
resistance; mental illness, homelessness, stress leave, voluntary
unemployment could be reframed as active forms of bodily and
emotional resistance. Jaggar (1989) talks about 'rebellious emo-
tions' and clearly our society requires such actions to be limited
and controlled, highlighting the threat they present to the estab-
lished order. This recognition would not seek to minimize the
enormous suffering felt by people involved but it could open
up the potential to more actively support and give legitimacy to
such acts. This could help to soften the harsh negative nature of
the experience and enable recognition perhaps of the ways their
bodies have actually taken some action to resist an oppressive
context (albeit often in contradiction to their own conceptual
wishes).
Interestingly the strong, invulnerable, courageous model of
an activist perhaps also blinds activists to the value of timidity
and weakness. Radicals may well in effect serve and support the
interest of the powerful in labeling these activities as a system
failure and in their own actions which provide a bodily and
emotional message, that strength, control and power is good. It
confirms an achievement, success and ambitious ethic and so at
a bodily and emotional level the activist may be reinforcing an
emotional context valued by the rulers of capital. The capitalist
may challenge the unemployed to get out an find jobs while in
perhaps a similar way emotionally the activist implores the un-
employed to become committed activists. Both adopt a powerful
identity which dialectically relies on others assuming a power-
less identity. Recognition of this leads to an exploration of the
potential resistance and challenge enfolded in the actions of non-
ambitious, fearful, anxious people. Perhaps such attitudes could
have a liberatory potential in some sense, which could undermine
the emotional character required for capitalist production and
competition.
Thus in short I am arguing for greater attention to the bodily
and emotive technologies that already are in implicit operation
in activist practice and everyday action, before turning to new
bodily and emotive action strategies. Once we have a good under-
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standing of current bodily and emotive processes it will be clearer
as to what new direction is required. The above discussion has
not sought to offer a definitive direction but rather simply seeks
to open up some possibilities for further exploration.
Conclusion
It is perhaps fitting to end this paper with an acknowledgment
of the paradox and contradiction in trying to theorise and write
about this topic when it can only really be understood through
a bodily and emotive resonance with the examples discussed.
Hopefully however the paper has demonstrated the great impor-
tance of bodily and emotive knowledge and the need for further
understanding in this area. Acknowledgment of the dominance
of rational conceptual processes and the suppression of bodily
and emotive knowing in critical social theory and the general
social work literature opens up and demands a radically new
appreciation of social work practice and theories of change. At
the same time much of what is said here will not be controversial
or unfamiliar to many practitioners. An old piece of social work
wisdom is that it is a good idea in any interaction to have touched
how the other is thinking, feeling and acting in relation to the issue
at hand. This very simple advice has an obvious almost trite ring
about it, but when considered in relation to the issues discussed
in this paper it takes on a revolutionary quality. It recognizes
emotions (feelings) and the body (action) as equally legitimate
realms for exploration along side the conceptual (thinking).
Current poststructural conceptions have challenge critical
theory and have highlighted the separateness that exists between
us at conceptual levels and so doing has encouraged: a more
fragmentary view of social life: a greater uncertainty about goals;
and a pessimism about the possibilities of change. However,
'while words and concepts distinguish and divide, bodiliness
unites and forms the ground of an empathetic, even universal
understanding' (Jackson, 1983, p. 341) and so a new base to
overcome division. Bodily and emotional knowledge directs us to
a new more fleshy and emotive materialism which could provide
new understandings, new directions and new possibilities for
seeking change to oppressive systems.
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